Four Bytes of Power: Exploiting CVE-2021-26708 in the Linux Kernel

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Positive Technologies

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OffensiveCon, Zer0Con, Linux Security Summit, Still Hacking Anyway, Open Source Summit, PHDays, Linux Plumbers and others

Agenda

• CVE-2021-26708 overview

- Bugs and fixes
- Disclosure procedure
- \odot Exploitation for local privilege escalation on $\times 86_{64}$
 - Hitting the race condition
 - Four-byte memory corruption
 - Long way to arbitrary read/write
- Server by passing SMEP and SMAP
- Possible exploit mitigation

- LPE in the Linux kernel
- Bug type: race condition
- Refers to **5** similar bugs in the virtual socket implementation
- Major Linux distros ship CONFIG_VSOCKETS and CONFIG_VIRTIO_VSOCKETS as a kernel modules

Attack Surface

- The vulnerable modules are automatically loaded
- Just create a socket for the AF_VSOCK domain:

vsock = socket(AF_VSOCK, SOCK_STREAM, 0);

- That's available for unprivileged users
- User namespaces are not needed for that

- I used the syzkaller fuzzer with custom modifications
- KASAN got a suspicious kernel crash in virtio_transport_notify_buffer_size()
- The fuzzer failed to reproduce this crash 🤪
- I inspected the source code and developed the reproducer manually

I found a confusing bug in vsock_stream_setsockopt():

```
struct sock *sk;
struct vsock_sock *vsk;
const struct vsock_transport *transport;
```

```
Let me look at it...
```

```
sk = sock->sk;
vsk = vsock_sk(sk);
transport = vsk->transport;
```

lock_sock(sk);

I found a confusing bug in vsock_stream_setsockopt():

```
struct sock *sk;
struct vsock_sock *vsk;
const struct vsock_transport *transport;
```

```
sk = sock->sk;
vsk = vsock_sk(sk);
transport = vsk->transport;
/* vsk->transport value may change here! */
lock_sock(sk);
```





- vsk->transport may change when the socket lock is not acquired
- In that case, the local variable value is out-of-date
- That is an obvious race condition bug
- I found **five** similar bugs in net/vmw_vsock/af_vsock.c
- Searching the git history helped to understand the reason

- Initially, the transport for a virtual socket was **not** able to change
- The bugs were implicitly introduced in November 2019 when VSOCK multi-transport support was added
- Fixing this vulnerability is trivial:

```
sk = sock->sk;
vsk = vsock_sk(sk);
- transport = vsk->transport;
lock_sock(sk);
+ transport = vsk->transport;
```

- November 14, 2019 Bugs were introduced
- January 7, 2021 My custom syzkaller got a crash
- January 11, 2021 I started the investigation
- January 30, 2021
 - My PoC exploit and fixing patch were ready
 - I sent the crasher and patch to security@kernel.org
 - Review started

Disclosure Procedure (1)

- I got very prompt replies from Linus Torvalds and Greg Kroah-Hartman
- We concluded on this procedure:
 - sending my patch to LKML in public
 - merging it to the upstream and backporting to the stable trees
 - (a) informing the distros about the security-relevance via linux-distros ML
 - Isclosing that at oss-security@lists.openwall.com when distros allow me
- The first step is questionable, though

Disclosure Procedure (2)

• Linus decided to merge my patch without any disclosure embargo

Linus:

"This patch doesn't look all that different from the kinds of patches we do every day"

• I obeyed and proposed that I should send it to LKML in public

Rationale

Anybody can find kernel vulnerability fixes by filtering kernel commits that didn't

appear on the mailing lists <u>https://arxiv.org/abs/2009.01694</u>

Timeline: Part 2

- February 2, 2021 The v2 of my patch was merged into Linus' tree
- February 4, 2021
 - Greg applied it to the affected stable trees
 - ▶ I informed linux-distros ML that the fixed bugs are exploitable
 - ▶ I asked how much time Linux distros need before my public disclosure
 - But I got this reply:

If the patch is committed upstream, then the issue is public. Please send to oss-security immediately.

- ► I made the public announcement: <u>https://seclists.org/oss-sec/2021/q1/107</u>
- February 5, 2021 CVE-2021-26708 is assigned

Pondering over the Disclosure Procedure

The question is rising: Is this "merge ASAP" procedure compatible with the linux-distros mailing list?

Counter-example: how I reported CVE-2017-2636 to security@kernel.org

- Kees Cook and Greg organized a one-week disclosure embargo
- Linux distributions in the linux-distros ML integrated my fix in their security updates in no rush
- Security updates were published synchronously when the embargo ended
- More info in this article: https://a13xp0p0v.github.io/2017/03/24/CVE-2017-2636.html



NOW ABOUT THE MEMORY CORRUPTION

- I exploited the race condition in vsock_stream_setsockopt()
- Reproducing it requires two threads
- The first one calls setsockopt()

setsockopt(vsock, PF_VSOCK, S0_VM_SOCKETS_BUFFER_SIZE,

&size, sizeof(unsigned long));

• The second thread should change the virtual socket transport

Changing VSOCK Transport

• It is performed by reconnecting to the virtual socket:

```
struct sockaddr_vm addr = {
    .svm_family = AF_VSOCK,
};
addr.svm_cid = VMADDR_CID_LOCAL;
connect(vsock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof(struct sockaddr_vm));
addr.svm_cid = VMADDR_CID_HYPERVISOR;
connect(vsock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof(struct sockaddr_vm));
```

• Meanwhile, vsock_stream_setsockopt() in a parallel thread is

trying to acquire the lock

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Race Condition: Full Picture

```
Thread 1: reconnecting to vsock
```

```
vsock_stream_connect() /* VMADDR_CID_LOCAL */
```

```
vsock_stream_connect() /* VMADDR_CID_HYPERVISOR */
lock_sock() /* locked successfully */
vsock_assign_transport()
vsock_deassign_transport()
virtio_transport_destruct()
kfree(virtio_vsock_sock)
vsk->transport = NULL
release sock()
```

```
Thread 2: setsockopt() for vsock
```

```
vsock_stream_setsockopt()
```

```
transport = vsk->transport
```

```
lock_sock() /* can't lock, waiting */
```

```
/* finally locked successfully, proceed */
vsock_update_buffer_size()
transport->notify_buffer_size()
virtio_transport_notify_buffer_size()
virtio_vsock_sock->buf_alloc = *val /* UAF */
```

Using Out-of-date Value From a Local Variable



Memory Corruption

- Write-after-free for virtio_vsock_sock object
- \bullet The size of this object is ${\bf 64}$ bytes
- This object lives in kmalloc-64 slab cache
- \bullet The buf_alloc field has type u32 and resides at offset 40
- The value written buf_alloc is controlled by the attacker
- Four controlled bytes are written to the freed memory

Fuzzing Miracle (1)

• syzkaller didn't manage to reproduce this crash

- I had to develop the reproducer manually
- But why did the fuzzer fail to do that?
- Looking at vsock_update_buffer_size() code gives the answer:

```
if (val != vsk->buffer_size &&
```

```
transport && transport->notify_buffer_size)
```

```
transport->notify_buffer_size(vsk, &val);
```

```
vsk->buffer_size = val;
```

Fuzzing Miracle (2)

- For memory corruption, setsockopt() should be called with different SO_VM_SOCKETS_BUFFER_SIZE value each time
- A fun hack from my first reproducer:

Fuzzing Miracle (3)

- Upstream syzkaller doesn't do things like that
- Syscall params are chosen when syzkaller generates fuzzing inputs
- Inputs don't change when the fuzzer executes them on the target
- I still don't completely understand how syzkaller got this crash
- $\overline{\mathbf{.}}$

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 syzkaller did some lucky multithreaded magic with vsock buffer size limits but then failed to reproduce it



NOW ABOUT EXPLOITATION, STEP BY STEP

- I've chosen Fedora 33 Server as the exploitation target
- The kernel version: 5.10.11-200.fc33.x86_64
- I had a goal to bypass SMEP and SMAP
- Bypassing KASLR is included, of course

Four Bytes of Power

Write-after-free of a 4-byte controlled value to a 64-byte kernel object at offset 40

- That's quite limited memory corruption
- I had a hard time turning it into a real weapon



Here and further I use images of the artifacts from the State Hermitage Museum in Russia. I love this wonderful museum!

Heap Spraying Requirements

- I started to work on stable heap spraying
- The exploit should perform some userspace activity that makes the kernel allocate another 64-byte object at the location of freed virtio vsock sock
- 4-byte write-after-free should corrupt the sprayed object instead of unused free kernel memory

Experimental Heap Spraying

- I made quick experimental spraying with add_key syscall
- I called add_key several times right after the second connect() to vsock while a parallel thread finishes the corrupting setsockopt()
- ftrace allowed to confirm that the freed virtio_vsock_sock is overwritten
- I saw that successful heap spraying was possible
- The next step: finding a 64-byte kernel object that can provide a stronger exploit primitive when it has four corrupted bytes at offset 40
- Huh, not so easy!

The iovec Technique is Useless Here

• I tried iovec technique from the Bad Binder by Maddie Stone and Jann Horn

A carefully corrupted iovec object can be used

for arbitrary read/write

- No, I got triple fail with this idea:
 - **③** 64-byte iovec is allocated on the kernel stack, not the heap
 - Sour bytes at offset 40 overwrite iovec.iov_len, not iovec.iov_base
 - This iovec exploitation trick is dead since the Linux kernel version 4.13, awesome Al Viro killed it with the commit 09fc68dc66f7597b in June 2017

Searching for a Special Kernel Object

- I had exhausting experiments with various kernel objects suitable for heap spraying
- I found msgsnd() syscall that creates struct msg_msg in the kernelspace:

/* message header */					
<pre>struct msg_msg {</pre>					
struct list_head	m_list;	/*	0	16	*/
long int	m_type;	/*	16	8	*/
size_t	m_ts;	/*	24	8	*/
<pre>struct msg_msgseg *</pre>	next;	/*	32	8	*/
void *	security;	/*	40	8	*/
};					
/* message data follows	*/				

• If struct msgbuf in the userspace has 16-byte mtext, the corresponding msg_msg is

created in kmalloc-64 slab cache, just like virtio_vsock_sock!

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Four Bytes of Power

• The 4-byte write-after-free can corrupt the void *security pointer at offset 40:

/* message header */					
<pre>struct msg_msg {</pre>					
struct list_head	m_list;	/*	0	16	*/
long int	m_type;	/*	16	8	*/
size_t	m_ts;	/*	24	8	*/
<pre>struct msg_msgseg *</pre>	next;	/*	32	8	*/
void *	security;	/*	40	8	*/
};					
/* message data follows	*/				

• Jokingly, I used this security field to break Linux security

 $\overline{\mathbf{\cdot}}$

Arbitrary Free

- msg_msg.security points to the kernel data allocated by lsm_msg_msg_alloc()
- It is used by SELinux in the case of Fedora
- It is freed by security_msg_msg_free() when msg_msg is received
- Corrupting 4 least significant bytes of msg_msg.security provides arbitrary free!
- That is a much stronger exploit primitive



- After achieving arbitrary free I started to think about where to aim it
- And here I used the trick from my <u>CVE-2019-18683 exploit</u>:
 - > Second connect() to vsock calls vsock_deassign_transport()
 - It sets vsk->transport to NULL
 - That makes the vulnerable setsockopt() hit the kernel warning
 - It happens in virtio_transport_send_pkt_info() just after UAF
 - My exploit can parse this kernel warning and extract useful info!

Kernel Warning Full of Secrets

WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 6739 at net/vmw_vsock/virtio_transport_common.c:34 . . . CPU: 1 PID: 6739 Comm: racer Tainted: G W 5.10.11-200.fc33.x86 64 #1 Hardware name: DEMU Standard PC (D35 + TCH9, 2009), BIDS 1,13,0-2,fc32 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:virtio_transport_send_pkt_info+0x14d/0x180 [vmw_vsock_virtio_transport_common] . . . RSP: 0018:ffffc90000d07e10 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 00000000000000 RBX: ffff888103416ac0 RCX: ffff88811e845b80 RDX: 00000000ffffffff BSI: ffffc90000d07e58 RDI: ffff888103416ac0 RBP: 00000000000000 R08: 000000052008af R09: 000000000000000 R10: 00000000000126 R11: 0000000000000 R12: 000000000000000 R13: ffffc90000d07e58 R14: 0000000000000 R15: ffff888103416ac0 00007f2f123d5640(0000) GS:ffff88817bd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 FS: CS 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000080050033 CR2: 00007f81ffc2a000 CR3: 000000011db96004 CR4: 000000000370ee0 Call Trace: virtio_transport_notify_buffer_size+0x60/0x70 [vmw_vsock_virtio_transport_common] vsock_update_buffer_size+0x5f/0x70 [vsock] vsock stream setsockopt+0x128/0x270 [vsock]

Kernel Infoleak

- A quick debugging session with gdb showed that:
 - RCX contains the kernel address of the freed virtio_vsock_sock
 - RBX contains the kernel address of vsock_sock
- On Fedora, unprivileged users can open and parse /dev/kmsg
- If one more warning arrives at the kernel log, the exploit won one more race
- The exploit can parse the kernel log and get the addresses from the registers



My further exploitation plan was to use arbitrary free for use-after-free:

- Free some object at the address that leaked in the kernel warning
- Perform heap spraying to overwrite that object with controlled data
- Get more power using the corrupted object

- Arbitrary free for vsock_sock address (from RBX) is useless
- It lives in a dedicated slab cache where I can't do heap spraying
- So I invented how to exploit use-after-free on msg_msg (from RCX)
- For overwriting msg_msg I used wonderful setxattr() & userfaultfd() heap spraying technique by Vitaly Nikolenko

Arbitrary Read with msg_msg: Part 1

Original struct msg_msg

struct list_head m_list = 0xffff8881XXXXXXX;

long int m_type = 1;

size_t m_ts = 16;

struct msg_msgseg *next = NULL;

void *security = 0xffff8881YYYYYYY;

msg_msg data

Overwritten struct msg_msg

struct list_head m_list = 0xa5a5a5a5a5a5a5a5;

long int m_type = 0x1337;

size_t m_ts = 6096;

struct msg_msgseg *next = 0xffff8881ZZZZZZ;

void *security = 0xffff8881YYYYYYY;

msg_msg data


kernel data for reading

Fake struct msg_msgseg

kernel data for reading

Arbitrary Read with msg_msg: Part 2

- Receiving this crafted msg_msg manipulates the System V message queue
- That breaks the kernel because the msg_msg.m_list pointer is invalid 😕
- msgrcv() documentation for the win!
- MSG_COPY flag allows fetching a copy of the message nondestructively in the message nondestructively.




Exploiting Arbitrary Read (1)

- 1. Get the kernel address of a good msg_msg
 - win the race on a virtual socket
 - call spraying msgsnd() after the memory corruption
 - parse /dev/kmsg and get the kernel address of this good msg_msg from RCX
 - \bullet also, save the kernel address of <code>vsock_sock</code> from <code>RBX</code>


Exploiting Arbitrary Read (2)

2. Execute arbitrary free against good msg_msg using a corrupted msg_msg



Exploiting Arbitrary Read (3)


3. Overwrite good msg_msg with controlled data using setxattr() & userfaultfd()



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Exploiting Arbitrary Read (4)

4. Read vsock_sock to the userspace using msgrcv() for the overwritten msg_msg



Sorting the Loot

That's what I found inside the vsock_sock kernel object:

- Plenty of pointers to objects from dedicated slab caches 😕
- struct mem_cgroup *sk_memcg pointer at offset 664
 - mem_cgroup objects live in the kmalloc-4k slab cache
 - ▶ I tried to call kfree() for it and the kernel panicked instantly 😕
- S const struct cred *owner pointer at offset 840
 - ▶ It points to the credentials that I want to overwrite for privilege escalation
 - It's a pity that cred lives in dedicated cred_jar slab cache
- void (*sk_write_space)(struct sock *) function pointer at offset 688
 - It is set to the address of sock_def_write_space() kernel function
 - \blacktriangleright That can be used for calculating the KASLR offset $\overline{oldsymbol{\odot}}$


Good Old Trick with sk_buff

- I used it in my exploit for CVE-2017-2636 in the Linux kernel
- I turned double free for a kmalloc-8192 object into use-after-free on sk_buff
- I decided to repeat that trick
 - ► A network-related buffer in the kernel is represented by sk_buff
 - This object has skb_shared_info with destructor_arg
 - Creating a 2800-byte network packet in the userspace will make skb shared info be allocated in the kmalloc-4k slab cache
 - That's where mem_cgroup objects live as well!

Use-after-free on sk_buff

- Create one client socket and 32 server sockets (for AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, IPPROTO_UDP)
- Send a 2800-byte buffer filled with 0x42 to each server socket using sendto()
- Perform arbitrary read for vsock_sock (described earlier)
- Calculate possible sk_buff kernel address as sk_memcg plus 4096 (the next element in kmalloc-4k)
- Perform arbitrary read for this possible sk_buff address
- If 0x42 bytes are found, perform arbitrary free against the sk_buff
- Otherwise, add 4096 to the possible sk_buff address and go to step 5

The Payload for Overwriting skb_shared_info



Control Flow Hijack

• I didn't manage to find a stack pivoting gadget in vmlinuz-5.10.11-200.fc33.x86_64

that can work in my restrictions

- So I performed arbitrary write in one shot
- SMEP and SMAP protection is bypassed!

```
/*
 * A single ROP gadget for arbitrary write:
 * mov rdx, qword ptr [rdi + 8] ; mov qword ptr [rdx + rcx*8], rsi ; ret
 * Here rdi stores uinfo_p address, rcx is 0, rsi is 1
 */
uinfo_p->callback = ARBITRARY_WRITE_GADGET + kaslr_offset;
uinfo_p->desc = owner_cred + CRED_EUID_EGID_OFFSET; /* value for "qword ptr [rdi + 8]" */
uinfo_p->desc = uinfo_p->desc - 1; /* rsi value 1 should not get into euid */
```

Arbitrary Write Using skb_shared_info

This weapon is used twice to get root privileges:

- Write zeros to effective uid and gid
- Write zeros to uid and gid



- Later I managed to perform stack pivoting using a JOP-chain
- And I managed to bypass the Linux Kernel Runtime Guard (LKRG)
- I'm preparing this material for publishing, stay tuned!

Demo Time

Possible Exploit Mitigation

- Exploiting this vulnerability is impossible with the Linux kernel heap quarantine
 - ▶ Because this memory corruption happens very shortly after the race condition
 - See the <u>article</u> about my SLAB_QUARANTINE prototype
- Against kernel module autoloading by unprivileged users grsecurity MODHARDEN
- Against userfaultfd() abuse setting /proc/sys/vm/unprivileged_userfaultfd to 0
- \bullet Against infoleak via kernel log setting kernel.dmesg_restrict sysctl to 1
- Against calling my ROP gadget -
 - Control Flow Integrity (see the technologies on my Linux Kernel Defence Map)
- Against use-after-free (hopefully in the future) -

ARM Memory Tagging Extension (MTE) support for the kernel, on ARM

• [rumors] Against heap spraying -

grsecurity Wunderwaffe called AUTOSLAB (we don't know much about it)

Conclusion

 Investigating and fixing CVE-2021-26708, developing the PoC exploit, and preparing this talk was a big deal for me

• I hope you enjoyed it!



- I managed to turn the race condition with a very limited memory corruption into arbitrary read/write for the Linux kernel memory
- I've published a detailed write-up:

https://a13xp0p0v.github.io/2021/02/09/CVE-2021-26708.html

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Thanks! Your questions?

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